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THE IMPERATIVE TO RESTORE NATURE:
SOME PHILOSOPHICAL QUESTIONS
Environmental philosophy, with special
emphasis on the ethic of environmental preservation,
is a field that grew out of public commitments well
outside the academic discipline of philosophy. The
imperative to preserve nature where possible, and to
restore nature where it had been damaged, evolves
from a growing public awareness of the fragility of
the natural environment (fueled by public alarms that
need not be reviewed here); a response to that
awareness in the formation of public policy (or at
least public rhetoric) forced the work to begin. We
seem as a nation to have accepted, at least for talking
purposes, the preservation and restoration of the
natural environment as a national priority. Nor is it
only, any longer, a matter of conserving natural
resources just in order to have more of the world to
exploit later. We are beginning to develop a true
environmental ethic, in what Holmes Rolston calls a
"primary, naturalistic sense" of the term, where
"humans ask questions not merely of prudential use
but of appropriate respect and duty."l We are being
told that our whole relationship with nature must be
reexamined and probably restructured, and we are
listening. A new national goal has been adopted -- to
preserve and to restore the natural environment -- and
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philosophical reflection on that goal has really just
begun.
If we accept that it must be done, that this end
must be accomplished, then by the habits of our
minds, we move automatically to the question of
means. How shall the task of preservation or
restoration be addressed? If we are engineers, we
may ask after the technology and resources that will
make the attainment of the goal possible. If we are
philosophers, we will ask fIrst how this end is even
to be conceived, let alone accomplished. By now it
should be no surprise that the environmental ethic
poses problems for the traditional categories of
philosophy. Following Aldo Leopold,2 leading
philosophers of the environmental field have initiated
us into the many conceptual and ethical difficulties of
the questions with which we will have to deal. (We
may mention, as most central to the development of
this paper, at least Paul Taylor,3 Eugene Hargrove,4
J. Baird Callicott,S and Holmes Rolston.6 There are
others; the field is growing and ramifying with speed
reminiscent of the early years of medical and
business ethics.) Besides containing diffIculties in
and for itself, environmental ethics throws into new
relief central problems of ethics as a whole, espe-
cially in its contemporary applications in fIelds of
practice like medicine or business. An exploration of
some of these problems, then, may be of use to the
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larger field of philosophy as well as to its newest
entrant.
We will consider the problems raised by the
environmental initiative in ethics in two parts. First,
and for the bulk of this paper, we will discuss the
difficulties that follow from the effort to define
"nature," or "the natural," and to define it in such a
way that we can distinguish it from whatever it was
we wanted to oppose to it (intuitively, some human
product: say, Shopping Malls); concomitantly, to
discern its value, so that it will be clear why we
ought to protect or restore nature when such care
opposes ordinary human activity (say, building
Shopping Malls). Second, more briefly, we will
attempt to derive from the foregoing discussion some
idea of the human fault that led to (or in some sense,
defines) the environmental crisis that we now face,
and corresponding to the fault, the general outlines of
the remedy we ought to be pursuing; this attempt
may take us to the boundaries of theology. The
notable incoherence in our efforts to address the
crisis follows in large part from dilemmas of
diagnosis at this level. We will not be able to follow
the discussion on to resolution, even if one appears;
at the end of the second part, we will attempt to
outline the difficulties entailed in discovering a
coherent ethic for the future, a reasonable and
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justifiable way of pursuing human good in the midst
of conflicting imperatives.
A final restriction: we spoke above of the
duty to "preserve and restore" nature as the central
perplexity of this paper. For this discussion,
wherever a chance to distinguish the two appears, we
will concentrate on the duty to "restore" nature,
simply because that duty forces the definition: if
"preserving" nature (again intuitively, from human
beings) is the objective, then we may treat nature as a
conceptual "black box" -- we may not have the
slightest idea what it is, but we know what to do
with it. We can faithfully preserve nature, under
whatever definition or evaluation, simply by keeping
human beings away from it. But if we are to restore
nature, as current national policy calls for the
restoration of certain wetlands, we have to have an
idea of what will count as restoration of nature so
we will know where to stop, and we will have to
have some idea of what makes it valuable so that we
will know what features shall be central in that
restoration.
I. Land Without Man: The Pursuit of the Natural
Central to the philosophical difficulties of the
environmental movement is the problem of
naturalism -- specifically, of the "naturalistic fallacy."
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Biology is notorious for impaling philosophy on the
Humean dichotomy of "is" and "ought. "7 The
healthy natural creature grows, and in its growth it
develops just as it ought to. When it is hungry, sick,
hurt, or threatened, it fights to get what it needs to
live, regain its health, survive attacks, and live life to
the fullest. It is a teleological system from start to
finish. The only evidence we have that it is doing
what it ought to do, when it does all these things, is
that the vast majority of its kind in fact do exactly
what it does: from the "is" of normal growth and
development we infer the "ought." In many cases,
failure to act as teleological system -- to act in such
ways as to survive, and to develop along the lines
laid down by the vast majority -- tends to be
correlated with conditions always held to be
undesirable: death, of course, also pain, misery, and
failure in functions important to the species. But the
correlation is not universal; we cannot simply point
to the pain, etc. as the disvalue marking subnormal
development. If a member of the species fails to
heal, grow and develop in the normal way, we
assume that there is something "wrong" with that
individual, and that it would be "better" for it to
recover and be like the others, without looking for
further disadvantages (much the approach we take to
the growth of our own children).
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All of this, of course, has been regarded as
completely fallacious since G. E. Moore, following
David Hume (and Plato, in the Euthyphro), pointed
out that the logic of verification of the empirical
observational statements is totally different from the
logic of verification (if such there is) of normative
claims, and labeled all systems that attempted to
bridge from one to the other as so many cases of the
"naturalistic fallacy. "8 If it makes sense to ask, in a
particular case of development or growth to maturity,
whether or not it was a good thing that the growth
took place, and in the case of certain pesky things
(tumors, etc.) it certainly does make sense to ask,
then the blanket assertion that" growth to maturity is
good" cannot be true.
Why do we insist (still) on understanding the
living world teleologically? Because it makes no
sense any other way. We learned that first from
Aristotle, who in the Metaphysics draws the
distinction between those things that have the source
of their becoming outside themselves (houses, for
example, which exist potentially in a pile of building
materials as long as there is nothing to hinder a
builder from making the house with them), and those
things that have the source of their becoming within
themselves.9 Living beings have their becoming,
their potential to be what it is they are determined to
be and the motive force to impel them toward that
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end, within themselves. Their mature form is in
them at the start; their fulfillment, or actuality, is
prior to their potential to attain it. "Also, everything
that is produced proceeds according to its principle,
for ... its coming into being is directed by the end;
hence the actuality is the end, and it is thanks to it
that a power is possessed. . . ."10 An animal is
defined, recognized, understood, and its behavior
guided and predicted, in terms of its mature form. If
we move to the Ethics, we find that the happiness of
humans, at least, and by presumption all living forms
(Le., all beings that have the source of their
becoming within them), lies in the achievement of
their nature and the fulfillment of their natural
function.ll Biology simply makes sense, for
Aristotle, only as a goal-directed system.
At least one form, and the most plausible
form, of the "naturalism" that G. E. Moore was
attacking, then, is just the imposition of Aristotelian
teleology on the natural world, and we can see why it
is. In many ways the very intelligibility of the
natural forms depends on our recognition of the
fundamentally goal-directed, value-driven aspect of
life. On that understanding, Nature is full of values
long before we take human purposes or preferences
into account, and no new values have to be adduced
in an ethic of "respect for nature": to respect it is to
let its potentialities actualize unhindered where
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possible, and to help them become actual where
previous invasion hinders their development.
Prior to any consideration of human use,
need, or enjoyment, then, an Aristotelian environ-
mental ethic begins with the imperative to leave
natural systems alone, to develop as they will, or if
necessary, to use human skills only to restore them
to their natural condition, the condition they would
have manifested had not some external agency,
usually human, interfered. Intervention on behalf of
the "natural," to restore nature by removal of the
blight, disease, parking lot or other interference in
natural function, is prima facie justified; other human
intervention is suspect.
Philosophically relevant implications proceed
immediately from the above. The viability of a value
(the "natural condition" of any ecosystem) suspended
from a counterfactual of unknown content ("had
outsiders -- probably humans -- not interfered with
it") may itself be problematic. Yet we have good
experience operating with such "natural" concepts.
In the practice of all health care professions, the
value of "the health of this patient" is established in
the same way: we attempt in each case to create or
restore a condition, health, that would be there
naturally if the disease (or gunshot wound, or
whatever it is we are treating) had not intervened.
Whatever faults we may lay at the door of the health
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care system in this country today, we recognize its
ability to cure disease and treat wounds.
Health care also gives us the framework for
structuring the secondary values in the Aristotelian
environmental ethic. The fIrst practical implication of
the adoption of any goal is the further adoption of a
hypothetical (means-end) structure to achieve it.
Clearly the necessary means to the ends of health and
thriving of the individual will themselves be values
(in the human case, "rights and liberties,
opportunities and powers, income and wealth,"
including access to food and medical care, are
universally held to be valuable).12 By the same
account, the conditions or enemies that blight growth
to maturity will become disvalues (in the human
case, we may include poverty, educational and
cultural deprivation along with the standard predators
and diseases). More interestingly, the habitat,
ecosystem or "land" (as we shall generally be calling
it) within which alone healthy development can be
actualized will also become a value. The ecosystem
is, of course, a means among other means: fIsh
cannot live without oxygen in the water, so sewage-
induced hypoxia is a disvalue for the fIsh; northern
spotted owls cannot live without nesting areas in the
snags of the old-growth forest, so clearcutting the
ancient groves blights their development (and in this
case wipes out their species). But the ecosystem is
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also, in the wild, a densely populated and diverse
system of interacting organisms that comes close to
being an organism in itself. That aspect of it bears
examination.
Among the internal (organic) "goals" of the
living organism we may distinguish between ends of
growth or actualization (progress over time from an
immature specimen to a mature specimen of the
species, with all attendant activities) and ends of
maintenance or stability. The most observable
activity of a growing organism is its change, from a
beginning, through middle stages of development, to
a predictable end as a mature (actualized) specimen,
before beginning an inevitable decline to death.
Within its constant change, however, there is much
in the individual that must not change very much:
body temperature, cell structure, and population of
alien organisms come immediately to mind. The
ends of actualization are in one sense prior to the
ends of stability, in that the latter exist for the sake of
the former, in order that the former may be achieved.
But in another sense, the ends of stability are prior,
in that they are tied directly to survival: if the
underlying, unchanging structures of the body are
badly disrupted, the organism dies. These goals of
changelessness -- goals of integrity, stability, or
homeostatis, we might call them -- are reproduced in
the ecosystem. It is not just that if the individual is to
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thrive, the ecosystem must, in general, remain whole
and stable -- that the ecosystem's stability has
instrumental value for the organism. More than that,
ecosystem stability is structurally identical, as an
organic condition, to organic homeostasis; if the
survival of the organism is a candidate for value,
then so is the survival of the ecosystem. Stability, or
integrity, provides us with the conceptual framework
to give a definition for the "good" of that ecosystem
as a whole, and make it eligible to be a value in
itself. 13
Of course all is in ceaseless motion, change,
and turnover in any ecosystem (or most: the
"ecosystem" includes relatively changeless rocks and
earth). But that is also true in any organism or
organic system, in which individual cells, particles of
matter, tend to endure relatively briefly. What is
essential, if we are to talk about the integrity of the
land or ecosystem, is that the fundamental
relationships among the members of that community
remain the same. Those functions that are necessary
for the ecosystem to continue its activity, and to
support the individual organisms within it, must be
maintained in that relationship. Since Aldo Leopold,
we have taken the preservation of the ecosystem as
the fundamental value of environmental ethics. As
he puts it, in his statement of the "land ethic": "A
thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity,
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stability, and beauty of the biotic community. It is
wrong when it tends otherwise."14 Living
organisms do their living, as it were, within larger
organisms, preservation of which is essential to the
survival of all their inhabitants, but which also have
value in and of themselves.
As Leopold recognized, there is a strong
difference between preserving or restoring a biotic
community, full of competing organisms, and
preserving or restoring a single organism (by feeding
it or healing its injuries).15 This difference permits
us to articulate a true land ethic, distinct from
various "animal rights" initiatives, which tend to
muddy the environmental waters and confuse the
environmental audiences. Yet the restorative
imperative to both individual animal and to
ecosystem is, for humans, the same: to discover its
natural (uncontaminated) condition, to remove the
hindrances to that condition, and to add what is
needed to restore the original set of relationships for
the self-sustaining ecosystem (as Aldo Leopold
restored a portion of the prairie in the front yard of
his "shack" in Sand County). We continue on the
health care model.
Difficulties attend this simple analogy. First,
in the health care cases we have a wealth of
relevantly very similar specimens to compare with
the present patient to determine what that desired
oooooooooooooooocococooo 13 oooooooocococococccocooo
condition would be, and how we shall know it when
we achieve it. "The Natural Ecosystem," understood
globally, simply does not present us with such a neat
paradigm. We still have a problem with criteriology:
we simply do not know how to set the criteria for
success in the restoration of the natural environment.
And second, we are still unclear on the source of the
value: in health care, we can always fall back on
human preference, since most people prefer to be
well than ill (and this preference can then be imputed
to infants and other incompetents). There is no such
fallback or imputational possibility in caring for the
land.
In short, we are not yet sure that the land
ethic can succeed in answering Hume or Moore.
Whence the value, the "ought," of a collection of
organisms that just is, just happens to have evolved
one way rather than another? Holmes Rolston has an
interesting suggestion along that line: that simply
because the organism has developed as it has, it has
value as "stored achievement,"16 and in that
complexity has a claim on our respect. Anything that
has evolved is right and has rights, on his account,
simply because it is the uniquely achieved organism
that it is.
Baird Callicott's way over the is/ought barrier
is even more intriguing for its use of Hume's own
moral philosophy as its basis. Hume concluded, as
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we recall, that the foundation of human morality lies
not in reason or fact, but in the moral sentiments
(passions, or warm feelings of approbation). I 7
These moral sentiments, as natural to us as our hands
and feet, can be directed to our own interests, to the
interests of others, or to society as a whole. Then
why not the environmental community as a whole?
Facts can be used, as Hume pointed out, not to
compel value judgments, but to call our attention to
the appropriateness of some object for our approving
sentiment. Ecology has done just that: the more we
know, the more we see ourselves as members of a
larger and more beautiful community, beholden to
the biosphere, drawn to love it and to want to protect
it. So we continue to teach, and learn, and love: and
our positive attitudes toward the environment
continue to increase, and we can ask for no more in
the way of moral justification. IS
Another interesting suggestion for the "is-
ought" resolution in the environmental field comes
through the very sciences that we employ in studying
the natural environment. For a beginning, when we
survey the facts, as scientists, our inquiry is far from
"value-free." We bring to any scientific investigation
the values of science: we aim to find order, law,
regularity, predictability, if possible, quantifiability.
When we find it, we make that in which the order
inheres the focal point of what is "real" in the
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phenomena we study, stripping away the
idiosyncratic and irreproducible. 19 The simplicity of
phenomenon achieved in this way is itself a value in
science, and underlies the scientific epiphenomenon
of "elegance," or beauty.
Simplicity is gained, for the biologist, when
we consider the normal, repeatable, biological
phenomenon: essentially, the birth, growth,
reproduction and death of organisms. That which is
idiosyncratic and various among individuals -- their
peculiar blights, diseases, accidents, or other
impediments to growth to full actualization -- is
dropped out of the equation, to allow clearer focus
on the normal individual. Then the phenomenon is
orderly and lawful -- I defy you to pretend that those
terms are not value-laden -- as soon as it is
understood as scientifically explainable, and the
beauty that Leopold referred to is patent in the
phenomenon so explained. Holmes Rolston put it
well:
What is ethically puzzling, and exciting, in
the marriage and mutual transformation of
ecological description and evaluation is that
here an "ought" is not so much derived from
an "is" as discovered simultaneously with it
. . . values seem to be there as soon as the
facts are fully in, and both alike are properties
of the system ... unity, harmony, interde-
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pendence, stability, etc., ... are valua-
tionally endorsed, yet they are found, to
some extent, because we search with a
disposition to value order, harmony,
stability, unity. Still the ecological
description does not merely confirm these
values, it informs them; and we find that the
character, the empirical content, of order,
harmony, stability is drawn from, not less
than brought to, nature ... the earlier data
are not denied, only redescribed or set in a
larger ecological context, and somewhere
enroute our notions of harmony, stability,
etc., have shifted too and we see beauty now
where we could not see it before.20
In some fragile sense, we have here a
resolution not only to the "is-ought" problem as it
manifests itself in environmental ethics, but to the
basic conceptual problems surrounding Aldo
Leopold's land ethics -- the "integrity, stability, and
beauty of the biotic community" are not arbitrary
values, but actually present as conditions (virtues?)
in well-functioning ecosystems, and the more we
understand them, the more we see their value. In
disrupted and destroyed ecosystem remnants, those
conditions are no longer present, and they have less
value. In some fragile sense, we have the
foundations for our environmental ethic, to ground
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decisions about what is worth restoring (and
preserving) in the land and what is not.
How fragile? Very fragile. Consider this
comment from George Gaylord Simpson's Attendin~
Marvels: A Pata~onian Journal:
Like almost all wild creatures, ostriches are
always diseased. In every one of the many
we opened, the intestines were choked with
worms, and external parasites are equally
abundant. Since this condition is the rule,
perhaps it should not be considered as a sort
of disease but as a normal ostrich condition,
and the animals may be thought of as small
migratory worlds, densely populated.21
What, exactly, is the individual, and what the
community? And where are the values? Following
Aristotle, we can make sense of the value of a
"healthy, thriving ostrich," growing from egg to
maturity well-nourished, active, free of all parasites
or other disease, happy and beautiful, to complete the
picture. Curing disease or eliminating other
individual conditions that get in the way of that goal
is no more than realizing, or actualizing, the natural
ostrich. We would be doing no more than restoring
nature if, discovering a diseased ostrich, we gave it
medicine for worms, flea power for its skin, and
extra vitamins and antibiotics to fend off any
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remaining ailments. Then it could present itself as
"healthy ostrich," pure and simple.
Or could it? Apparently the "rule" here is that
when we see an ostrich, we are actually looking at a
traveling ecosystem for smaller forms of life. No
doubt they have subsisted there for much of the
ostrich's life. What is their moral status? Are they
not as natural as the ostrich? And are the worming
tablets, then, not the moral equivalent of clearcutting
an ancient grove, destroying habitat in the name of
some value that has nothing to do with what is
natural for this bird? Our preference for ostriches
with bright eyes and clear intestines, over the sickly
ones found in nature, may be simply the naturalist
equivalent of our historic preference for manicured
parks over wilderness. It may be that we just need
education: not to prefer ostriches to worms, or
worms to the microbes that eventually destroy them.
Perhaps there is no place to draw the line between the
individual and the ecosystem. Where is the "natural"
place to stop?
But that kind of thinking, of course, opens of
a Humean Pandora's Box. Beavers are evolved
beings, their legendary skills and industry one of the
finest of the "stored achievements" of the natural
world. And their dams are as natural as they are;
beavers that did not build dams would not, in
essence, be beavers. But we have exactly the same
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evidence (no more than prolonged observation of the
normal behavior of the species) to conclude that the
Shopping Mall is natural, as one of the natural
constructions of a species (humanity) that has equally
evolved over time. It is essentially human to build,
something; we cannot be sure than a humanoid
species that had no conception of the Shopping Mall
would for that reason alone not be human, but we
can say with certainty that the Mall (along with the
acres of asphalt parking lot surrounding it) is as
natural a part of the human condition as any
Amazonian Indian Village or neolithic farm.
The attempt to establish a foundation for the
discussion of the environmental ethic, then, ends in a
paradox. We wanted to conduct this inquiry in two
steps: fIrst, what is "natural"?, and the second, more
difficult, why should we value it? We have
obtained, somewhat to our surprise, several decent
accounts of why we should value it: we should
value it for the complexity of its accomplishment,
which commands our respect; for the beauty
discovered in its complex order, which informs and
raises our standard of beauty generally, for the love
we have for it as our own community, and for its
general instrumental value to all organisms, including
ourselves, in making possible our functional
integration and our survival. We value in nature
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what we value it for, and try to preserve and restore:
its stability and its integrity.
What has eluded us to this point is an account
of the "natural" that might be put on an objective
basis. We have, at the present stage of the search,
no way to distinguish in respect to "naturalness"
between the ostrich and its worms, or, for that
matter, between a cathedral grove of redwoods and a
Shopping Mall. We may be reduced to saying that
the beauty found in certain orderly natural systems
just is the value we were looking for, and we will
judge all purportedly natural systems by the criterion
of beauty. The criterion of "beauty," of course, if
not carefully defined for the purpose, throws us back
on subjective grounds. Is "unspoiled" nature, i.e.,
whatever there was before humans tampered with it,
more beautiful than a planned and tended park? I
doubt that the majority of the human race would say
that it was. Experience suggests, in fact, that a
certain amount of educational experience is essential
even to fmd the woods more beautiful than the Mall.
The criterion of beauty does allow us to prefer the
ostrich to its worms, of course. But is even that
preference only learned, and would not further
education show us the loveliness in worms? As our
understanding of the beautiful is contracted to Malls
by lack of education, so it can be extended to worms
by further education.
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This is an odd home to reach after an odder
odyssey of values. We started (as a species) seeing
nature only as matter without form -- structureless
building materials waiting for us to create form, to
put the materials to use in agriculture and industry.
At some point within the last century, we began to
study nature through the eyes of biologists and
ecologists (recovering an Aristotelean perspective),
as a house already built, whose architecture we
meant to understand. "Nature" became a magnificent
pattern to be appreciated by the observant scientist,
even if, as above, much of the order, integrity,
beauty and stability that the scientists found was
imported from the founding assumptions of the
sciences themselves. And the sciences did not have
the only or last word on the subject. "Nature,"
artifact of scientific method, became equally an
artifact of literature, poetry, and ultimately
philosophy, a construction worthy of admiration,
preservation and restoration because of its richness
(diversity), its beauty (order), and above all its
primeval innocence. In the absence of the human
imprint, the Romantics found freedom from the
bustle, greed, and exploitation of industrial life -- in a
real sense, freedom from sin. Nature, from being
merely a pile of raw materials for human use, became
for the Romantics (and remains for us) worthy of
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reverence just because of, and insofar as it retains, its
freedom from human influence and control.
Then what is "natural," deserving of
preservation and restoration? At least two meanings
of the term, equally justified, are held in tension at
this point: (1) whatever is, human or otherwise,
since all is of nature, including the Mall; (2) what is
except that which is human, i.e., natural creatures
exclusive of humans, whose existence represents an
achieved value and who deserve our help, or at least
forbearance, for that reasons; the land, itself, natural
ecosystems, exclusive of human artifacts. Given
that humans, and human activity, are as natural as
anything else, excluding them is irrational. But
including them, Malls and all, leaves us with an
environmental ethic empty of content.
Let us review. When we started out to
examine our commitment to the restoration of nature
and the ethics of environmental relations, we
assumed that by "nature" we meant to exclude at least
the Shopping Mall, and it is not reassuring to find it
rearing its head in that first ethic as candidate for
protection. The second is certainly in accord with
our intuitive starting point, for we surely assumed
that preserving and restoring nature meant keeping or
reviving animals and environmental structures that
interest us -- that structure our history as a people
and fire our imaginations -- and that humans have,
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verifiably, disturbed by poaching, clearcutting, or
infringement of habitat. We want the restoration of
(for instance) whales and big fish, wolves, ostriches,
salt marshes, redwood forests, prairies and buffalo.
But a justification for this position is very
elusive, absent some subjective standard of beauty to
human eyes or interest to small children. For now it
seems that Nature cares not whether the bays and
sounds of the coastal waters are populated by large
interesting fish or the swarms of microbes that take
over when sewage destroys the oxygen supply, and
is just as happy with the variety of fresh water plants
that take over when the salt marsh has lost its
saltiness, and hence its peculiar natural community.
Nature is indeed bioegalitarian, and we cannot derive
from the succession of organisms and ecosystems
any point which is approved, or good, toward which
we might aim our efforts to "restore" it. Let us add
one correction: Nature is ecoegalitarian, indifferent
among states of being; we cannot even fmd in Nature
an injunction to rescue living things, of any kind,
from a forest fire or volcano, for that is how
populations decrease, leaving niches for others. In
short, from the above, nature stubbornly is, resisting
all attempts to fmd oughts anywhere.
Then the second position -- Nature is
whatever is, whatever happens, however it happens,
except for the effects of hwnan presence and activity,
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which are not natural, or anti-natural -- is our only
alternative. Note that it is no more tenable than
anything else, if we focus on the land only.
Whatever the state of the land just before human
beings tromped allover it, we have no reason to
select that condition of the ever-changing land as
"natural," more than any other of the thousand states
of the land before the humans got there. To get to
the "land ethic," we must, apparently arbitrarily,
adopt misanthropy itself as our focus and touchstone:
Nature is, in the end, defined in terms of the
unnatural, that is, as contrasted to human activity
and effect. 22 Whatever human beings can be kept
away from, is nature preserved; restoring nature
means removing or eradicating the signs of human
presence, whatever they may be.
The imperative to restore nature, then, in
order to make sense at all, commits us to the claim
that human presence by itself, whatever its causes, is
taint. Entailed is the conclusion that all human
activity (save that of restoration) is ipsofacto evil in
the sight of Nature. Then humans, when they touch
nature, sin; and the drama of restoration is one of
repentance and, just possibly, redemption. Our next
task is to analyze that sin.
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II. Sin
The logical entailment of the imperative to
restore nature, then, is the conviction of sin for all
the human race. Nature is pristine, in this reading,
when it is untouched -- specifically by humans. No
other species is similarly excluded, save those
particularly associated with human operations (dogs,
etc.), and only because of that association. Nature is
pure, and humans, sinful, taint it. What is the nature
of that sin? There are three possibilities.
(1) We have sinned through ignorance. We
had no idea how our natural activities were damaging
nature; what we needed was more scientific
information. We are now bending every effort to
redeem the damage that was inadvertantly done, and
to adopt new, wiser, ways of using nature's
resources in the future. The goal is one of
"sustainable development," a condition which, unlike
the uncontrolled growth of the past, will allow us to
live without harming natural structures or using
resources faster than we can replace them. This goal
will have to be achieved by conservation (an end to
wasteful practices in acquisition of natural materials,
taking no more than grows), recycling (an end to
wasteful practices in the disposal of trash, reusing
everything that can be reused), development of
substitutes for products that damage the environment
(CFCs, carcinogenic chemicals), and above all
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development of alternatives to fossil fuels for energy.
The technological demand is very high, but should
be our first priority. Once the technological
breakthroughs have been achieved, we will be able to
live indefinitely in harmony with nature.
The message here is unremittingly hopeful:
we just made a mistake, we're learning how to do
better, and next time we will get it right, through the
achievements of science and technology. This
analysis of the sin that led to the paving of paradise
is, as we would expect, the favored one for the halls
of government and the business community,
especially since it calls so clearly for the exercise of
our ancient virtues, technical ingenuity and a cheerful
activism.
(2) On the second analysis, that last is
precisely what is wrong with the first analysis. On
this understanding, we have sinned through hybris,
pride, arrogance, the use of power -- specifically
male power -- to exploit. It is the exploitative and
power-wielding androcentric society itself that must
be stopped. We will not be able to address human
exploitation of nature until we stop all the other
forms of careless and brutal exploitation: the
exploitation of third world countries by first world
countries, of peaceful countries by warlike ones, of
people of color by white people, of the poor by the
rich, of animals by humans, and centrally, of women
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by men. Until we do, all technological fixes will
only land us deeper in environmental destruction.
The remedy for exploitation is not more
manipulation, but respect. All of these exploitations,
by the way, are connected. The same characters
continually reappear as the exploiters: the white
European/North American men who effectively ran
the world until the present day. It is their dominance
that must be broken; the entire "ecofeminist"
movement is dedicated to breaking it, and to
establishing a new order of relationships among
humans and between humans and others.23
Reformation in this case is considerably more
elaborate than in the first analysis. It will entail at
least an analysis of hybris, and a recognition on the
part of the decisionmakers that hybris, not excusable
ignorance, is the source of our difficulties with the
environment. A call for revolution is futile, since the
domination that must be abolished is a domination of
all the powerless by all the powerful. No
revolution could succeed under these conditions,
especially since the powerful are quite willing to
accept, and co-opt, any leaders who emerge among
the powerless. So the powerful themselves, faced
with the inevitable end of their empire in any case
(environmental ruin will end their domination if
nothing else does first), must come to the recognition
of the exploitative and reactionary features of their
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society, must renounce them, and cooperate in the
restructuring of our institutions to abolish
exploitation once and for all. An entirely new ethic
of governance will extend equal respect to all,
regardless of race, color, creed, gender, culture or
preferences, wealth or species. Once that ethic, and
the institutions appropriate to it, are in place, genuine
progress can be made in preserving the environment.
(3) The third analysis goes to the heart of the
matter: the problem is with the relationship of all
humans to all nature, and the sin lies in loss of
reverence for the natural world, loss of a sense of
being a part of a larger -- and superior -- whole. The
"deep ecology" movement springs from a profound
sense of this loss, and an attempt to spell out what
would be needed to recover the appropriate human-
ecosystem relation. The platform of deep ecology is
simple enough: "The well-being and flourishing of
human and nonhuman Life on Earth have value in
themselves .... These values are independent of the
usefulness of the nonhuman world for human
purposes. "24 Included in that intrinsic value are "the
richness and diversity of life forms; only vital needs
give humans the right to reduce this richness and
diversity."25 The implications of "flourishing," in
the steps that are to be taken -- including a significant
"reduction of the human population, decreased
interference with the nonhuman world, a change in
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economic and technological structures, and an
ideological change in the direction of an emphasis on
life quality" -- are nothing short of staggering.26 Yet
they are worth examining, if only for the illumination
they throw on the real state of environmental
philosophy.
For this school, or rather, this informal
collection of thinkers, both analyses so far are
inadequate. The fIrst, agreed, is simply more of the
same exploitation, save more wisely applied so that it
may last longer. The second, however, is not much
better. It addresses only the issues among humans,
then extends as an afterthought to the natural
world.27 Not surprisingly, when it includes the
natural world it includes the wrong parts of it in the
wrong way. It extends from rights of African-
Americans to rights of Women to rights of Animals,
as it were, in the same breath, and then is ready to
extend to animals (farm animals and pets fIrst) the
same respect for individuality and rights that white
American humans presently enjoy. But we never
wanted to include animals individually. Protecting
the individual animal (white-tailed deer, for instance)
can be detrimental to nature as a whole, and
protecting domesticated animals -- the artificially
spawned cows, horses, and small predators of our
houses -- is patently absurd. What needs protection
is the whole of nature, the entire biosphere, of which
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we are a part. Our dogs and cats do as much damage
to that as they can, although not as much as our cars.
We need to relearn, not equality of power, but
subjection, subjecthood, as a precondition of
citizenship, a sense of being a part, and a very
inferior part, of a natural scheme to which we owe
loyalty, respect, and deference. In that under-
standing we can reach that "self-realization appro-
priate to a part of a whole and a member of a biotic
community."28
Given the scope, and kind, of the problem,
the second analysis seems more adequate than the
fIrst and the third more adequate than both of them.
Technology is, after all, more of the same kind of
power that has brought us to this pass. If it resides
in the same hands as before, we have no reason to
think that, push come to shove, it will not be used to
destroy nature in the name of human gain. So the
first analysis is inadequate, even disingenuous:
those who have done the harm ask for more time and
money to spend on yet more expensive toys and
means of modifIcation of the environment, devices
which, as the scientific experts in power, they alone
will be able to use.
But from the perspective of the ecologist, the
second analysis, the political diagnosis and
prescription, is not much of an improvement.
Surely, women feel oppressed, and maybe our
political structures should be modified to lessen that
oppression. But political justice between the sexes,
even world wide, would not change anything for
nature. Possibly worldwide economic justice, a
genuine sharing of the goods of this world among
people of all colors, wealth, and state of
technological advance, would indeed modify our
impact on nature, but not for the better: the
wealthiest people in the world have the worst
environmental impact, and to turn the entire
population of the world into equals of ourselves in
standard of living -- Le., in consumption and
pollution patterns -- would destroy the earth's
environment in much less time than it will take with
the present injustices in place. From the perspective
of Nature, the second analysis is so much political
whining, addressed to the holders of power by those
who would like to take their places, with no prospect
at all of restoring nature, or even of addressing the
problem of how to do it.
The third analysis rings true. Human sin is
neither ignorance, nor the simple type of hybris that
encourages the powerful to oppress the powerless by
a simple logic of domination29 of their own species.
The sin must be identified as a peculiar form of
matricide, or parasitic murder: we are children of
earth, and can live only as a portion of the life of the
land, yet we are destroying it for our own short-term
00000000000000000000ססoo 32 coooooooooooooooooooooo
gains and short-sighted objectives. We are like the
cancer, spawned within the body as a nonnal part of
the body's community, suddenly gone berserk and
destructive, displacing all other members of the
community, depriving them of resources, strangling
them with poisons. We have no right to do this.
The only way to restore nature, from this
perspective, is to retreat, and to withdraw our
powers to do harm, like a cancer in remission. This
will entail, over time (but not too long a time) a real
reduction of the human population, the restoration of
species to the fullest possible richness and diversity,
a public policy of ecoegalitarianism. Strong
measures must then be taken to cut human pollution
to zero, end the use of fossil fuels, and recover an
environmentally sound way of living, possibly by
learning some of the lessons that the hunter-gatherers
have to teach us. So drastic are the measures, as a
matter of fact, that we can safely assume that no one
will ever adopt them. But is this line of thought then
condemned indefinitely to irrelevance or
impracticality? For it would be a shame to lose track
of its insights.
From the point of view of adequacy of scope,
from the perspective of the land, then, the first
analysis is worthless, the second wrongly aimed,
and the third accurate. Yet from the point of view of
workable solutions, the order is the reverse: the
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technological improvements we can seek
immediately, for whatever good they will do;
political changes can be brought about more slowly,
although, again, their effect is unclear. The deep
ecology movement may have accomplished its only
attainable objective just by pointing out to the rest of
us that our "solutions" are not at all the promised
panacea, but may be contributing more to the
problems they were meant to solve.
It is not clear how the normative ethics of the
environment might bid us to proceed in such
compromised circumstances: to hold out for the truer
vision, at whatever cost in time and money (and lost
opportunities for amelioration)? Or to adopt the
mildly ameliorative solution, risking distraction from
the main problems? The situation is not unique to
environmental ethics. It shows up in medical ethics,
in the practice of less-than-ideal medicine: do you
refuse to participate in surgery conducted in badly
ordered circumstances, where sterility cannot be
guaranteed, or in procedures like abortions where
there may be powerful non-medical arguments
against the procedure? Or do you participate, on
grounds that your expertise can improve the patient's
chances of recovery?
In the field of applied ethics, such dilemmas
are known collectively as the dilemmas of "the
Jesuits on the Beach": when the Yankee slave ship
captains met the Arab slavers on the beaches of
Africa to carry on their wretched trade, the Jesuits
were there to baptize as many of the Africans as they
could, especially those that were near death, to argue
for leaving women and children behind, and to lobby
for better conditions for the captive slaves. The
condition for their work was that they not ever, there
or anywhere else, protest the practice of slavery
itself. Given that they did good -- more good for the
slaves, certainly, than anyone else was doing -- it is
certain that their work could be justified. But was it
the best that could be done? We did not know then,
and we do not know now, whether that particular
compromise was the right or best one. It would
appear that the same uncertainty will torment the field
of environmental ethics for the forseeable future.
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